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Citing security concerns and fears of future illicit behavior,
cities hosting Republican and Democratic National Conventions
and large-scale protests have taken extreme measures to curtail
dissent.I The 2008 Republican National Convention (RNC) in the
Twin Cities saw a continuation of the aggressive tactics of past
conventions, resulting in a chilling effect on free speech and
assembly. 2 A "chilling effect" describes a situation in which
speech or conduct is inhibited or discouraged by fear of
penalization, prompting self-censorship and therefore hampering
free speech. 3 A law or police action need not explicitly prohibit
legitimate speech to create a chilling effect; the actions of the
government must merely pose an undue burden and deterrent
effect on freedom of expression. 4 The chilling measures at the
2008 RNC included large-scale arrests, preemptive raids on
private residences, and the use of violence to disperse otherwise
peaceful crowds. 5
t. J.D. expected 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005,
University of Minnesota. I wish to thank my wife Amy for her love, support, and
patience throughout my law school career, as well as my family for always
encouraging me to strive for excellence. I also wish to thank the staff and editors of
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their efforts in bringing
this piece to publication. This Article is dedicated to all who lost their right to
dissent at the 2008 RNC.
1. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Second Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 32, Coal. to March on the RNC and
Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn. 2008) (No.
08-835 JNE/JJG) (rejecting the protestors' proposed parade route and time in an
effort to preserve public safety and order).
2. Nick Coleman, Editorial, Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Wrong Lessons from
the RNC, STAR TRIB., Sept. 9, 2008, at B1 ("Yes, you can blame the out-of-control
protestors. But everyone felt chilled."); Police Actions Designed to Chill Free Speech
of RNC Opponents: Permitted March for September 1 Goes Forward, March on the
RNC and Stop the War Media Blog, http://www.marchonrnc.org/node/75 (Aug. 31,
2008, 11:22).
3. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 257 (8th ed. 2004).
4. Id.
5. PUB. SAFETY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW COMM'N, REPORT OF
THE REPUBLICAN NAT'L CONVENTION PUB. SAFETY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Law and Inequality
Current judicial remedies for redressing abuse of police
power do not adequately protect the First Amendment rights of
those who choose to dissent at conventions and large-scale
protests. By examining the merits of police abuse in a post-hoc
fashion, courts provide police with unlimited power to chill free
speech when dissenters most desire to express their views. 6 Part I
of this Article will document the abuses of power that occurred in
past National Conventions, as well as select legal adjudications
emanating from those events. Part I will also focus on government
restriction of demonstration activities in the Twin Cities during
the 2008 RNC. Part II will detail the current state of available
judicial remedies. Part III will identify the insufficiencies
associated with the various judicial options. Part IV will
recommend new burden-shifting frameworks which will enhance
protections for the constitutional right to dissent. In sum, this
Article seeks to show how the freedom to dissent is chilled at
National Convention protests and how shifting various legal




The quad-annual gatherings of delegates of the Republican
and Democratic political parties to nominate their candidate for
President always draw large oppositional crowds. 7 Strong police
responses have coincided with the protests and demonstrations
held at the respective parties' conventions, especially since the
infamous 1968 Democratic National Convention (DNC), where
scores of demonstrators were arrested amid numerous allegations
of a "police riot."8
REVIEW COMM'N 74 (2009) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]; Randy Furst &
Anthony Lonetree, Promises of Police Review Also Raise a Few Questions, STAR
TRIB., Sept. 8, 2008, at B8 ("Police have been accused of unnecessary arrests, using
excessive force and excessive use of chemical irritants.").
6. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5 (discussing the various
methods employed by the police during the 2008 RNC in order to curtail protest
activities organized to occur simultaneously with the RNC).
7. See, e.g., Graham Rayman et al., Massive Protest Mostly Peaceful, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 30, 2004,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/magazine/nyc-protO830,O,5602809.story
(noting that organizers estimated that up to 400,000 people protested on a single
day of the 2004 RNC in New York).
8. Mary M. Cheh, Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment
Protection of Special Places, 8 D.C. L. REV. 53, 54 n.5 (2004).
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Since that time, police have developed enhanced security
techniques to ensure law and order. Demonstration zones or free
speech zones have become a popular technique to better control
demonstrators. 9 At the 2004 DNC, protestors were only allowed to
protest in a 300 x 90 square foot caged demonstration zone.10
Judge Douglas P. Woodlock referred to the sight as "an offense to
the spirit of the First Amendment" and "a brutish and potentially
unsafe place for citizens who wish to exercise their First
Amendment rights."11  The judge also noted that "[t]he overall
impression created ... is that of an internment camp." 12
Despite the increased police presence and strategic planning,
the 2004 RNC protests in New York resulted in roughly 1,800
arrests, 13  a significant increase from the 1968 DNC
demonstrations. 14 In addition to the free speech zones, the New
York Police Department employed techniques such as casting
large nets over crowds and arresting everyone caught in the net. 15
The arrested demonstrators were brought to an old bus depot that
was used as a makeshift holding facility; many were detained for
hours in unclean conditions, which caused some to break out in
rashes.16 The facility was popularly dubbed "Guantanamo-on-the-
9. See generally James J. Knicely & John W. Whitehead, The Caging of Free
Speech in America, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 455 (2005) (noting that since
9/11, the use of demonstration zones and similar control tools has increased in an
effort to maintain safety).
10. Id. at 457-58.
11. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F.
Supp. 2d 61, 76 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(A)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston,
378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
12. Id. at 74. Despite the colorfully negative language from Judge Woodlock,
the court denied the injunction, holding that whether the design of the
demonstration zones was narrowly tailored could not be determined by the court.
Id. at 74-75; see also Thomas Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of 'Place" in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2598-99 (2007)
(describing the court's analysis in Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention).
13. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
14. Paul Haridakis, The Tension Between National/Homeland Security and the
First Amendment in the New Century, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 433, 448
(2005).
15. Police Trampled Civil Rights During Republican National Convention,
NYCL U Charges, ACLU, Oct. 7, 2004,
http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/protest/11518prs20041007.html.
16. Julia Preston, Lawsuit is Filed Over Detention of Protesters During
Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at B8; Democracy Now!, Guantanamo On
the Hudson: Detained RNC Protesters Describe Prison Conditions, DEMOCRACY
Now!, Sept. 2, 2004,
http://www.democracynow.org/2004/9/2/guantanamo-onthehudsondetainedrnc.
One detained demonstrator summarized her experience: "[y]ou didn't want to sit
on the floor, that's for sure." Tom Hays, Complaints Swirl Over Holding Area For
Arrested Protesters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 1, 2004, available at
2009]
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Hudson." 17  When facial challenges are brought against such
policing tactics, however, courts generally will not overturn them,
reluctant to second guess the security rationale employed by the
government. 18
B. The 2008 RNC
The Twin Cities, host of the 2008 RNC, undoubtedly
encountered illicit behavior from certain demonstrators. The acts
of violence included smashing police cars and store front
windows, 19 and a particular individual launching a fifty-pound
sandbag onto a highway.20 Reports indicated that demonstrators
were attacking vehicles transporting Republican delegates with
bricks and bottles, 21 as well as puncturing their buses' tires. 22 On
the more docile side, there were reports of various groups tipping
over newspaper boxes and emptying large trash bins into the
street. 23 Many of the demonstrators committing violent acts likely
had a goal of getting arrested, or at least knew that their actions
were likely to result in an arrest. 24 Overall, the damage done to
private property was relatively limited in comparison with other
memorable large-scale protests. 25
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0902-03.htm.
17. Democracy Now!, supra note 16. The protestors may have been detained
longer had Judge Cataldo of the New York Supreme Court not ordered their
release. See Julia Preston, Judge Keeps City on Notice Over Convention Protest
Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at B3.
18. See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2004)
(upholding Boston's use of a designated demonstration zone, despite a district court
finding that the demonstration zone was "an offense to the spirit of the First
Amendment" (quoting Coal. To Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of
Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 76 (D. Mass. 2004))); Coal. to March on the RNC and
Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn. 2008)
(denying injunctive relief for restrictions to parade route).
19. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 46; Posting of Orin Kerr to The
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1220326475 (Sept. 2, 2008, 24:34)
[hereinafter Volokh Conspiracy].
20. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 43-48, 72; Editorial, An Appropriate
Show of Police Force, STAR TRIB., Sept. 2, 2008, at A12.
21. Volokh Conspiracy, supra note 19.
22. Emily Gurnon, Protester Pleads Guilty to Felony, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Oct. 15, 2008, at 7B.
23. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 46.
24. St. Paul Police Chief Matt Bostrom defended the validity of arrests stating
that "[pleople worked hard to get arrested.... It didn't just happen." Furst &
Lonetree, supra note 5. St. Paul Mayor Chris Coleman stated that "[w]e have for a
year watched people who made very clear that they were coming to the city of St.
Paul to commit criminal activity." Randy Furst & Anthony Lonetree, Protest
Arrests: Security or Repression?, STAR TRIB., Sept. 4, 2008, at Al.
25. See, e.g., PUB. SAFETY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW COMM'N,
REPORT OF THE REPUBLICAN NAT'L CONVENTION PUB. SAFETY PLANNING AND
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Despite the relative lack of property damage and violence,
the police continued to employ far-reaching measures in the name
of maintaining security and order, as seen in past conventions.
One action garnering significant attention was a series of
preemptive raids on the private homes of individuals who were
hosting activists. 26 A team of local and federal agencies raided six
buildings, claiming to target the self-described anarchist group the
"RNC Welcoming Committee." 27  The raids did yield weapons,
ingredients for Molotav cocktails, buckets of urine and feces, and
plans to blockade the delegates from the convention.28 The raids
resulted in eight arrests. 29 Some of the members were held on
"probable cause holds,"30 and others were later charged with
conspiracy to riot in furtherance of terrorism. 31 Most notably, the
raids depended on the information of informants who pretended
for an extended period of time to be associated with the targeted
activist groups. 32
Although only eight individuals were arrested, when the
police raided the buildings, they handcuffed and interviewed
scores of people located inside. 33 When added together, there were
hundreds of seemingly innocent activists temporarily detained. 34
Additionally, the police seized what would normally be considered
constitutionally protected literature, buttons, pamphlets, leaflets,
IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW COMM'N EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7-8 (2009) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY] (identifying the 1999 Seattle World
Trade Organization Conference (WTO) as "[t]he seminal event in threats to
national and international conferences"). At the infamous WTO Protests,
demonstrators were seen "carrying bottles filled with flammable liquids, locking
down intersections by forming human chains from lightpost to lightpost, breaking
windows at retail stores, overrunning and looting small retail stores, and jumping
on cars." Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005).
26. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-37.
27. Heron Marquez Estrada, Bill McAuliffe & Abby Simons, Police Raids
Enrage Activists, Alarm Others, STAR TRIB., Aug. 31, 2008,
http://www.startribune.com/local/27703754.html?elr=KArksLckD8EQDUoaEyqyP4
O:DW3ckUiD3aPc:_Yyc:aULPQL7PQLanchO7DiUX.
28. Id.; see also Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/posts/1220218012.shtml (Aug. 31, 2008, 17:26) (detailing a "three-
tiered strategy" to blockade the RNC Convention).
29. Jon Collins & Alex Robinson, U Student to Plead Not Guilty to Terrorism
Charges, MNDAILY.COM, Oct. 13, 2008,
http://www.mndaily.com/2008/10/12/u-student-plead-not-guilty-terrorism-charges.
30. National Lawyers Guild, Press Releases,
http://www.nlg.org/news/index.php?entry-080831-110018 (Aug. 31, 2008, 11:00).
31. Collins & Robinson, supra note 29.
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and books. 35 Despite the objections of those owning the materials,
the full collection of materials was allowed to be retained by the
police department "to preserve claims by the criminal defendants
that the police officers overreached their authority under the
search warrant."36
The far-reaching nature of the measures taken during the
preemptive raids continued during the actual protests at the RNC.
Typically, some use of force by police is allowable when probable
cause exists to make an arrest.3 7 During protests for which a
permit has been issued, police do not have probable cause to make
arrests unless an individual is committing an illegal act.38 Once a
permit has expired, however, the police have a right to arrest
protestors for "presence at an unlawful assembly" following police
orders to disperse. 39 Thus, by being in the protest area after the
permit has expired, although not committing any act of violence,
people can be arrested and have force used against them. 40 The
only probable cause that an officer needs is the demonstrator's
presence. 41 Following this mantra, the St. Paul Police repeatedly
used tear gas, pepper spray, smoke grenades, and nightsticks to
disperse crowds. 42 Additionally, there were numerous reports of
35. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Minn., ACLU Sues St. Paul and Minneapolis
for Release of Educational Materials Seized During Raids, Sept. 4, 2008,
http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/protest/36640prs20O80904.html.
In Demuth v. Fletcher, No. 08-0593, 2008 WL 4151841 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2008), the
court reviewed the seizure of the materials on the last day of the convention, and
despite noting that the notion that hundreds of copies of documents needed to be
retained as evidence was "far-fetched," the court held that injunctive relief was
inappropriate because the activists had gotten along for the first three days of the
convention without the materials, thus no additional substantial irreparable harm
would occur by not returning the materials to them expediently. Id. at *3.
36. Demuth, 2008 WL 4151841, at *3. The court apparently put the activists in
a lose-lose situation by not allowing the materials to be used for their intended
purpose; instead, the court required that the materials be maintained by the police
so that the other activists criminal cases could be dismissed. See id.
37. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.06(1) (2008) (outlining the authorized use of force,
including police use of force).
38. See Final Day of Tense Anti-War Protests Goes Out With a Flash Bang, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 5, 2008, http://obrag.org/?p=1511.
[hereinafter Final Day] (quoting Minneapolis Police Sergeant Bill Palmer and
suggesting that during the permit's valid time period, protestors had the right to
assemble).
39. Id.; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 7 (detailing a St. Paul
Police Department brochure which warned that, "[e]ven if you are not engaged in
unlawful activity, you are subject to arrest if you do not leave the area defined by
the police in their order to disperse").
40. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 7; see also MINN. STAT. §
609.06(1) (2008)(outlining when the use of force is authorized).
41. § 609.06(1).
42. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 49, 57, 60, 64, 74.
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protestors being met with nightsticks and pepper spray as they
tried to escape the tear gas that authorities had fired at them. 43
In sum, the absence of a permit justifies the use of force against
individuals who are engaging in non-violent political expression.44
In addition to using harsh tactics to disperse crowds, the
police made mass arrests of demonstrators during the 2008
RNC. 4 5  More than 800 protestors were arrested during the
convention; yet only fifteen percent of those arrested were charged
with a criminal offense. 46 Also, some of the remaining charges
were dismissed by the court.4 7 Numerous demonstrators were
caught up in "sweeps," where the police would surround an entire
group of protestors and arrest all of them. 48 Charges brought
against a person in a sweep were more likely to be dismissed, as
the arrested individual was unlikely to have been personally
observed committing illicit acts. 49
Not only were mass arrests carried out against
demonstrators, but also forty members of the media were caught
in the fray and arrested as well.50 Many were pepper sprayed, as
43. Id. at 74 (concluding that the St. Paul Police used pepper spray "offensively"
on crowds, and that they should have instead "simply arrested those individuals
engaged in peaceful... unlawful behavior").
44. While pepper spray and tear gas do not typically have long term effects,
they can cause tremendous short term pain and suffering, and can also prompt
panic and emotional distress. See C. Gregory Smith & Woodhall Stopford, Health
Hazards of Pepper Spray, 60 N. C. Med. J. 268, 269 (1999). But see, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., PEPPER SPRAY UPDATE: MORE FATALITIES, MORE
QUESTIONS 2 (1995), available at
http://www.aclu-sc.org/attach/p/PepperSprayNewQuestions.pdf (suggesting that
pepper spray may have long term and serious effects).
45. Chris Havens, Media Detained at RNC Won't Face Court Action, STAR TRIB.,
Sept. 20, 2008, at B2.
46. Pat Pheifer, RNC Charges Fall by the Wayside, STAR TRIB., Feb. 21, 2009, at
Al.
47. Id.
48. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Minn., At RNC, Arraignments Begin and
Arrests Continue, Sept. 4, 2008,
http://www.aclu-mn.org/home/news/atrncarraignmentsbeginanda.htm (' Most of the
people arraigned.., were swept up in mass arrests .. ").
49. See, e.g., People v. Munoz, No. 2004NY065044, 2005 WL 3134229, at *4
(N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Mar. 22, 2005) (evaluating an arrest made in a 300-person
sweep at the 2004 RNC, in which the court dismissed the complaint against the
defendant for failure to be "personally observed" committing any wrongdoing). Of
the 396 people arrested in the final night of the convention, who were pinned on a
bridge and detained in a mass arrest, 323 were never charged. Pheifer, supra note
46.
50. COMMISSION REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 25, at 7; Jason
Hoppin, Protestors or Press? During the RNC, it Often Didn't Matter, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 5, 2008, at 1A ('More than 30 - and possibly as many as 50,
based on an informal Pioneer Press survey - were arrested.").
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they typically stationed themselves near the police line in order to
document confrontations. 51 Most famously, the police arrested
Amy Goodman, host of Democracy Now!, and charged her with
obstructing the legal process when she presented her credentials
to a line of riot police upon learning that two of her producers had
been arrested. 52 The police also tackled and smashed the camera
of an AP journalist before checking his press pass and releasing
him. 53 Some weeks later, the City of St. Paul decided to drop all
charges against journalists, including Amy Goodman. 54
In sum, the police used aggressive and far-reaching tactics
during the 2008 RNC. Whether the threats to security were real
or imagined, the police certainly took drastic measures to advance
security in the name of law and order.
II. The Current State of Legal Remedies for Demonstrators
Arrested or Injured by the Police
Demonstrators whose First Amendment rights are chilled are
not totally without recourse. Protestors with criminal charges
stemming from the 2008 RNC can move to dismiss the charges
just like any other criminal defendant. 55 Individual
demonstrators or groups can also challenge the facial
constitutional validity of restrictive government regulations and
policies. 56 Lastly, demonstrators who feel their constitutional
rights were violated may also seek civil damages from the
government. 57
A. Criminal Dismissals
Although many protestors were arrested or detained and
released without charge, many were charged with offenses such as
Unlawful Assembly, 58  Riot or Conspiracy to Riot, 59 Civil
Disorder, 60 and, in extreme cases, Conspiracy to Riot in
51. Hoppin, supra note 50.
52. Id
53. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 23.
54. See Havens, supra note 45.
55. MINN. STAT. § 630.18(7) (2008).
56. See, e.g., Bl(A)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004)
(showing that while the First Circuit did not find a prevailing injunction
appropriate in a challenge to conditions for demonstrators at the 2004 DNC, the
demonstrators were able to at least challenge the policies).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
58. MINN. STAT. § 609.705 (2008).
59. Id. § 609.71.
60. Id. § 609.669.
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Furtherance of Terrorism. 61 If motions for criminal dismissals of
charges following the 2004 RNC are any indication, demonstrators
with pending charges should not be overly optimistic. To survive a
motion to dismiss, the prosecution only has to show "facial
sufficiency" of the complaint. 62 Similar to the notice pleading
requirements in civil cases, 63 if the facts alleged would constitute a
criminal offense, then the complaint is sufficient. 64  In three
published decisions concerning motions to dismiss stemming from
the 2004 RNC, the New York Criminal Court dismissed one case 65
and found the other two complaints facially sufficient. 66 Emerging
from those cases was a theme that dismissal was appropriate
when the defendant was not "personally observed" committing any
criminal activity, but simply swept up in a large raid. 67  If
Minnesota courts follow the New York Criminal Court decisions,
then the police will only need to state that they "personally
observed" a defendant committing a certain act, and the claim will
survive dismissal. 68
The defendant in People v. James challenged the facial
constitutionality of the New York Administrative Code 69
regulating unpermitted parades and demonstrations. 70 The court
relied on Thomas v. Chicago Park District,71 which held that as
long as the ordinance was "content neutral," it would satisfy First
Amendment concerns, provided that the regulation required
specification of the reasons for denial. 72 Thus, the James court
held that New York's content neutral ordinance met the Thomas
requirements, and was constitutional. 73 If People v. James is any
61. Id. § 609.713.
62. People v. Munoz, No. 2004NY065044, 2005 WL 3134229, at *1 (N.Y. City
Crim. Ct. Mar. 22, 2005).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
64. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.06, subd. 2(2) (stating that a motion to
dismiss may be brought if the "facts stated do not constitute an offense").
65. Munoz, 2005 WL 3134229, at *1.
66. People v. Cohen, 2005 WL 293510 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Feb. 7, 2005); People
v. James, 793 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2005).
67. Munoz, 2005 WL 3134229, at *4.
68. See id. (finding as fatal to the complaint the failure to allege that the
defendant was "personally observed" in order to connect the defendant to illegal
activity or conduct).
69. ADMIN. CODE OF CITY OF NY § 10-110(a-c) (1996).
70. James, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 875-77.
71. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002). The James court
stated, "[t]he ruling in Thomas ... is dispositive of the constitutionalo issue."
James, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 877.




example, Minnesota defendants seeking to challenge the facial
validity of the unlawful assembly ordinance7 4 will have an uphill
battle, as long as the ordinance is found "content-neutral. 75
B. Constitutional Challenges
Demonstrators can bring facial challenges to laws and
policies, arguing that the regulations violate the First
Amendment. 76 The Supreme Court in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism77 articulated a standard for First Amendment challenges
involving public protests:
[I]n a public forum the government may impose reasonable
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech,
provided the restrictions "are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that
they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
of the information."
78
However, the challenged policy or law "need not be the least
restrictive or least instructive means of doing so." 79  The
regulation will not be invalidated, "[s]o long as the means chosen
are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government's interest," even if "some less-speech-restrictive
alternative" is available.80 The government must be "content
neutral" in its actions and cannot regulate the speech based on
simple disagreement. 8 1
The demonstrators' ability to choose the time, place, and
manner in which they dissent is vital to their exercise of freedom
of expression. 82 The power of the RNC protestors' message is
74. MINN. STAT. § 609.705 (2008).
75. See Thomas, 554 U.S. at 322-24. Defendants in Minnesota may still be
able to challenge the constitutional validity of § 609.705 as applied to their
particular cases.
76. See, e.g., Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul,
Minn., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn. 2008) (involving an argument that the City's
regulations violated the First Amendment).
77. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1984).
78. Id. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)).
79. Id. at 798-99.
80. Id. at 799.
81. Id.
82. Crocker, supra note 12, at 2587. According to Crocker:
Would the principle of free speech have value if there were no public place
to speak? What would be the point of dissent if political differences were
relegated to the realm of "freedom of thought," disappearing into the silent
mental lives of those who harbor political disagreement with prevailing
orthodoxy? What would be the value of free speech if public dissent
[Vol. 27:413
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diminished when that protest is not permitted to occur during the
RNC, nor near the RNC, nor with the freedom for demonstrators
to march as they choose. In this context, numerous challenges
have been brought against limitations in parade routes,8 3 denial or
revocation of public assembly permits,8 4 and emergency orders to
contain demonstrations.8 5
If challenges to the constitutionality of restricting political
demonstrations are brought as emergency motions and appeals,
courts will view the challenges under the traditional Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) framework. 8 On a motion for
preliminary injunction, the "court considers: (1) movant's
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) threat of irreparable harm
absent injunction; (3) balance between that harm and harm
experienced by other parties if injunction issues; and (4) the public
interest."8 7  These challenges have been largely unsuccessful, as
the government has been careful to adhere to the Rock Against
Racism requirement of content neutrality, which diminishes the
movant's likelihood of success on the merits.8 8
Demonstrators challenging government regulations are
nonetheless successful on occasion. At the 2000 DNC, Los Angeles
restricted protestors' access to the event by creating an 185-acre
security zone around the convention site and by requiring parade
permit applications to be filed at least forty days in advance.8 9 In
disappeared?
Id.
83. E.g., United for Peace and Justice v. Bloomberg, 323 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2003)
(denying a motion to enjoin a march outside of the United Nations headquarters);
Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 557 F.
Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn. 2008) (involving a march during the 2008 Republican
National Convention).
84. Randy Furst, Police Revoke RNC Permit for Welfare Rights Group, STAR
TRIB., Aug. 13, 2008, at B4.
85. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005).
86. See Coal. to March, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
87. Id.
88. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). In Grove v.
City of York, Penn., 342 F. Supp. 2d 291 (M.D. Pa. 2004), the court found the
officers' refusal to permit protestors to display signs depicting aborted fetuses
during the parade was not content neutral and held for the plaintiffs under a §
1983 action. Id. at 302. The lesson from Grove is that a city can either prohibit all
protesting or none, but cannot choose which types of protestors can march. See id.
The views, however, of those protesting a Republican or Democratic National
Convention are well-known to the greater public. See Serv. Employee Int'l Union v.
City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (SEIU) (doubting
the content neutrality of the secured access zone at the 2000 DNC and noting that
although some democrats would be denied access to the "secured zone," all non-
Democrats would be denied access).
89. SEIU, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 971-73.
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Service Employees International Union v. City of Los Angeles,
groups seeking to conduct demonstrations at the 2000 DNC
brought an action for injunctive relief to bar the city from
enforcing the restrictive policies. 90 The court noted that because
the validity of restrictions impacting the First Amendment was at
issue, the government had the ultimate burden of establishing
that the regulations were narrowly tailored and that ample
alternative channels were available. 91 The court held that the
185-acre "secured zone" was not narrowly tailored, because the
secured zone covered much more area than necessary to protect
the delegates and blocked expressive activities twenty-four hours a
day.92 The demonstrators were also not afforded ample means of
communication since the speakers were not permitted to reach
their intended audience: the DNC delegates and attendees. 93 The
court also held that the forty day permit request period and the
other permit procedures imposed a prior restraint and "vest[ed]
public officials with unbridled discretion to implement terms and
conditions on the permit."94
Challenges to regulations limiting free speech at the 2004
national conventions did not enjoy the same success seen in
Service Employees International Union. The National Council of
Arab Americans was denied a permit to hold a rally on the Great
Lawn in Central Park during the 2004 RNC. 95 Despite noting that
the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm,96 the court denied
their motion for injunctive relief and held that the denial of a
permit was legitimate due to the absence of a "rain contingency" 97
90. Id. at 968.
91. Id. at 970 (citing N.A.A.C.P., W. Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346,
1354 (9th Cir. 1984)).
92. Id. at 971-72. The court noted "that banning political speech is an
unacceptable means of planning for potential misconduct." Id. at 972.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 975. The court in SEIU also cited Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), which found that unfettered discretion can become
a means of suppressing a particular point of view. 505 U.S. at 130-31. The SEIU
court did recognize that the "defendants have a significant government interest in
providing security to those attending the convention;" however, the court held that
the "secured zone" around the DNC venue was not narrowly tailored to serve that
interest because it burdened more speech than was necessary. 114 F. Supp. 2d at
975
95. Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260-
62 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The Great Lawn has great symbolic importance, as it
represents "the heart and soul of New York City." Id. at 263 (citations omitted).
The plaintiffs argued that the Great Lawn was a vital part of their political
message, "namely acceptance and equality of Arab Americans." Id.
96. Id. at 266.
97. Id. at 264 (noting that a large crowd could significantly harm the Great
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and the inability to control the size of the crowd. 98 The court
placed the burden on the plaintiffs to establish a "clear" or
"substantial" likelihood of success on the merits, holding that
governmental policies were entitled to a higher degree of
deference. 99 The court also noted in dicta that even if the permit's
denial was unconstitutional, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to
injunctive relief due to the "daunting security concerns facing this
City" during the 2004 RNC. 100
The events surrounding the creation of a "demonstration
zone" at the 2004 DNC in Boston and the ensuing litigation 0 1
have received heavy attention from First Amendment
commentators. 102 In Bl(A)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, the
First Circuit upheld the Massachusetts District Court's denial of a
preliminary injunction, allowing demonstrators to protest outside
the designated "demonstration zone." 10 3 The court found that the
demonstration zone "imposed a substantial burden on free
expression," 104 and "left little opportunity for groups wishing to
demonstrate to do so within sight and sound of the delegates."'
105
Nevertheless, the court was deferential to "the government's
judgment as to the best means for achieving" its legislative
objectives.106
Lawn if the grass was wet).
98. Id. at 263-64. Organizers expected as many as 75,000 demonstrators, a
number within the capacity of the Great Lawn. Id. at 270. However, because the
organizers could not guarantee that the capacity of the Great Lawn would not be
exceeded, the court ruled that the "inability to control the size of the crowd" was a
legitimate reason for denial of a park permit. Id.
99. Id. at 266.
100. Id. at 272. The court also noted that the "events will take place against the
backdrop of 'a persistent threat of terrorist attack."' Id. at 265. Whether the court
was referring to the National Council of Arab Americans or speaking more
generally is unclear. See id. The parties eventually settled for the plaintiffs
attorney's fees, $50,000 in damages, and the undertaking of a feasibility study to
determine under what conditions large rallies can be held on the Great Lawn. See
Stipulation and Order of Voluntary Dismissal at 2, Nat'l Council of Arab Ams., 331
F. Supp. 2d 258 [hereinafter Stipulation and Order of Voluntary Dismissal].
101. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F.
Supp. 2d 61, 76 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(A)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston,
378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
102. See Crocker, supra note 12; Knicely & Whitehead, supra note 9; Ronald
Krotoszynski & Clint Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1239, 1319 (2008); Susan Nanes, "The Constitutional Infringement Zone"- Protest
Pens and Demonstration Zones at the 2004 National Political Conventions, 66 LA. L.
REV. 189, 197-202 (2005).
103. 378 F.3d at 10.
104. Id. at 13.
105. Id. at 11.
106. Id. at 13.
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In contrast, the court in Stauber v. New York107 invalidated
New York City's use of "pens"'108 to enclose demonstrators to a
confined area and found unreasonable the search of protestors'
bags as a condition of entrance to the pen, leading up to the 2004
RNC. 109 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, and
damages for injuries that they alleged resulted from the use of
"pens" in various 2003 demonstrations. 110  The plaintiffs' first-
hand experience was relevant to the preliminary injunction motion
and likely aided in achieving a favorable result."' The court
noted that the plaintiffs needed to only show a likelihood of
success on the merits and did not impose a higher standard that
would have been deferential to government regulations. 112
The most recent facial challenge to a city regulation was seen
at the 2008 RNC in St. Paul. In Coalition to March on the RNC
and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul (Coalition to March on the
RNC), a Minnesota federal court denied the plaintiffs request for
a preliminary injunction to require the city to allow the protest
parade route to encircle the RNC venue, not merely to come
"within sight and sound" of the convention hall. 113 The court
compared past conventions and held that the demonstrators had
"unprecedented access to the convention site."114  The court, in
holding that encirclement of the convention site would
"substantially compromis[e] significant government interests," 11
was also concerned with reports of protestors planning to blockade
the RNC site 116
In sum, plaintiffs have had varying degrees of success in
bringing facial challenges against government regulations on
public speech. 117 In light of the well-publicized Bl(A)ck Tea Society
107. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004).
108. The "pens" were described as "NYPD's use of interlocking, metal barricades
to create four-sided enclosures in which demonstrators are expected to assemble
during demonstrations." Id. at *3.
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id. at *1-2.
111. See Nanes, supra note 101.
112. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870 at *22-23.
113. Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 557
F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1021 (D. Minn. 2008).
114. Id. at 1021-22.
115. 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (citing Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New
York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
116. Id. at 1026; see also supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text
(summarizing the events of the 2008 RNC).
117. Compare SEIU, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that the City's
proposed "secured zone" was not narrowly tailored because it burdened more
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opinion,118 groups have not been as successful.11 9 Each decision,
however, is heavily fact dependent, leaving room open to grant a
preliminary injunction in the future, should government
regulations be found unduly restrictive. 120
C. Civil Remedies
Demonstrators who are subjected to police brutality, arrest,
or intimidation may always bring an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Section 1983 actions can be maintained against government
employees if they are not entitled to qualified immunity. 121 The
two-part test for denial of qualified immunity is (1) whether the
plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated, and (2) whether
those rights were so clearly established that reasonable
defendants would have known that their specific actions
transgressed those rights. 122
Many plaintiffs, instead of suing the individual officer, prefer
to sue the municipality that employs the officer. 123 For liability to
attach to the municipality under § 1983, the officer's conduct must
be a product of city policy or custom.124 Liability may also attach
to a municipality if the violation was found to have occurred due to
speech than necessary), and Stauber v. City of New York, 2004 WL 1593870
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004) (holding that the police department's policy "of closing
streets and sidewalks at demonstrations without making reasonable efforts to
provide information about access is an insufficiently narrowly tailored time, place
or manner restriction because it unnecessarily burdens the ability of persons to
attend demonstrations"), with Bl(A)ck Tea Soc'y, v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st
Cir. 2004) (concluding that although the City's security measures were extreme,
they were still narrowly tailored), Coal. to March, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (stating
that the City's restriction on parade routes was narrowly tailored and served
significant government interests), and Nat'l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d
258 (denying plaintiffs' preliminary injunction).
118. 378 F.3d 8.
119. See, e.g., Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d
1212 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that demonstrators were not unconstitutionally
prohibited from protesting in the traditional public forums surrounding the hotel
within which defense ministers of nineteen member nations of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) were meeting); Coal. to March, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014
(holding that the city's denial of the permit was content neutral, as required for
valid time, place, and manner requirements, that the denial was sufficiently
narrowly tailored to promote the city's interest in security, and that the denial left
open ample alternatives for communication of the protestor's message).
120. In Coal. to March, the court examined street-by-street the parade route in
determining whether St. Paul's regulation was narrowly tailored. 557 F. Supp. 2d
at 1026-27.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
122. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
123. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (indicating that
the plaintiff brought suit against the municipality).
124. Id. at 691-94.
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a police officer's lack of training, where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference of an individual's constitutional
rights. 125
Demonstrators bringing § 1983 actions related to arrests or
other police activity at large-scale protests have had varying
degrees of success. In Menotti v. City of Seattle,126 a case that
stemmed from thousands of arrests during the WTO protests, the
court held that issues of fact remained as to whether the officers
were acting pursuant to municipal policy when they implemented
an order in an unconstitutional manner and as to whether an
officer's warrantless seizure of a protestor's sign was justified by
exigent circumstances. 127 The court, however, upheld the facial
constitutionality of the order under the Rock Against Racism
test.128 The court also held that the order on its face did not give
unfettered discretion to the officers who were administering the
restricted zone. 129
In Victory Outreach Center v. Melson,130 a minister was able
to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his First
Amendment rights were violated for the words he spoke, and as to
whether the police had probable cause to arrest him for preaching
the gospel to assemblages on college campuses.13 1  The court
determined that the municipality had given sufficient training and
that the municipality did not adopt a policy of inadequately
training its officers on First Amendment issues. 132 Thus, the
municipality could not be held liable for the individual officer's
acts with "deliberate indifference." 133
In Lyons v. City of Lewiston, 34 a gay-rights protestor was
arrested for leaving a demonstration zone when President George
H.W. Bush visited his city. 135 The Maine Supreme Court held that
the police defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, and
that since an issue of fact remained as to whether the defendants
engaged in conduct that amounted to careless indifference to the
demonstrator's First Amendment rights, summary judgment was
125. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
126. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (Wash. 2005).
127. Id. at 1150-55.
128. Id. at 1142-44.
129. Id. at 1145-46.
130. Victory Outreach Center v. Melson, 313 F. Supp. 2d 481 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
131. Id. at 491-92.
132. Id. at 495.
133. Id.
134. Lyons v. City of Lewiston, 666 A.2d 95 (Me. 1995).
135. Id. at 98.
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precluded on punitive damages grounds. 1 36
Thus, plaintiff demonstrators have had relative success suing
under § 1983. Many of these cases, however, are dismissed or
settled. 137 Further, each holding is tailored to its particular facts,
such that future demonstrators cannot be assured that they will
have the same outcome. 138  Lastly, each of these cases
undoubtedly takes enormous time and expense to fully adjudicate
and takes committed individuals to be successful. 139
D. Policy-Change Settlements
"Police misconduct litigation around the country has resulted
in several settlements to help restrain over-reaching law
enforcement and facilitate the exercise of free speech." 140 Under
one settlement reached after a violent Washington, D.C. march,
the police department agreed to revise its handbook and training
in order "to provide protections for protesters, including a
requirement that officers report use of force during mass
demonstrations and forbid arrests without evidence that a crime
was committed."141 The police department also agreed to "include
restrictions and prohibitions on the use of police lines against
protestors and instruct[] officers that parading without a permit is
not an arrestable offense."' 142
"In June 2005, the City of Los Angeles entered into a
settlement agreement in... an action arising from the use of
unlawful force and disruption of lawful assemblies during the 2000
Democratic National Convention, as well as at a demonstration on
October 22, 2000." 143 According to the National Lawyers Guild,
which brought the suit:
The terms of the settlement provide that demonstrators
136. Id. at 99-102.
137. See, e.g., Stipulation and Order for Voluntary Dismissal, supra note 100
(agreeing to settle the case for the plaintiffs attorney's fees, $50,000 in damages,
and the undertaking of a feasibility study to determine under what conditions large
rallies can be held on the Great Lawn).
138. Compare Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005)
(discussing WTO riots in Seattle), with Lyons, 666 A.2d 95 (regarding a protest
against the President by a small group).
139. See, e.g., Stipulation and Order for Voluntary Dismissal, supra note 100
(noting attorney's fees of over $500,000).
140. HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, PUNISHING PROTEST:
GOVERNMENT TACTICS THAT SUPPRESS FREE SPEECH 53 (2007),
https://www.nationallawyersguild.org/NLGPunishing-Protest_2007.pdf.





participating in lawful assemblies are not to be prevented
from using public sidewalks adjacent to a lawful march route..
• . [Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)] officers are not to
use their motorcycles as a weapon of crowd control against
peaceful demonstrators. Less-lethal munitions may only be
used on "armed suspects or individuals showing aggressive or
combative actions . . .[and] are not to be used on a lawfully
dispersing crowd or individual." The settlement provides that
before declaring an unlawful assembly, the LAPD Incident
Commander should evaluate the feasibility of isolating and
arresting individuals responsible for unlawful conduct, and
should pursue such action if feasible. 1
44
III. The Problem
As Part II demonstrates, protestors challenging government
action have experienced varied degrees of success. Although the
criminal, constitutional, and civil damages contexts present
different burdens to the demonstrators, the onus to show that
government action was illegitimate rests on the demonstrators in
all scenarios.
A. Criminal Defendants Need Greater Protection
If New York City Criminal Court is any example,145 a
criminal defendant need only be "personally observed" committing
the alleged act for a complaint to be facially sufficient. 146
Therefore, criminal defendants, even if the charges against them
are completely without merit, face a jury trial to determine
whether their liberty will be taken away for what is normally
considered a constitutionally protected political protest. 147 Thus,
free speech does not receive heightened consideration when
determining whether a criminal prosecution should go forward to
trial. 148
Similar to the inadequacy of civil remedies, a demonstrator
144. Id. at 54-55. Settlements and consent decrees similar to those described in
Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles have also been reached in Chicago, Columbus,
Albuquerque, Oakland, Denver, New York, Portland, and Detroit. See id. at 53-62
(citations omitted).
145. Currently there are no published criminal adjudications emanating from
the 2008 RNC in St. Paul, Minn.
146. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
147. See generally Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S 37,
45 (1983) ("In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity
are sharply circumscribed.").
148. See, e.g., People v. Munoz, No. 2004NY065044, 2008 WL 3134229 (N.Y.
City Crim. Ct. Mar. 22, 2005) (granting a motion to dismiss based on facial
insufficiency, but without reference to free speech).
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arbitrarily arrested at a national convention loses the time, place,
and manner of his political protest. 149  Furthermore, other
demonstrators or members of the community who witness mass
arrests and other oppressive tactics may think twice about
engaging in political protest. 15 0 Therefore, even if an individual is
able to get his charge dismissed, that person has lost his right to
dissent, and the public could be chilled from engaging in political
protest both at the time of the demonstration and in the future.
B. Facial Challenges Fall Short
The Rock Against Racism test allows time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech. 151 However, the time, place, and manner of
large-scale demonstrations-such as protesting a Republican or
Democratic National Conventions-is essential to the adequate
expression of the dissenter's view.152 Whether it is the ability to
not only come within "sight and sound" of the convention, but also
to actually march fully past the delegates, 153 the ability for Arab-
Americans to hold a rally on the Great Lawn in Central Park,154 or
the ability to be able to express views outside of a designated free
speech zone far away from the convention, 155 the manner in which
protestors dissent is as important as the actual message that they
seek to convey. 156
Not only is the Rock Against Racism test weighted against
demonstrators, plaintiffs must also confront the test in the context
of a preliminary injunction.157 To establish a likelihood of success
on the merits, the plaintiff must show that the government's
149. See Nick Suplina, Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment
Law, Political Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 396
(2004-2005).
150. See generally Coleman, supra note 2 (discussing the effect of police presence
on typical citizens, not protesters).
151. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1984).
152. See Suplina, supra note 149, at 405-06.
153. See Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F.
Supp. 2d 1014, 1030 (D. Minn. 2008).
154. See Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258,
260 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
155. See BI(A)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004).
156. See Crocker, supra note 12, at 2587-88; see also Lamont v. Postmaster
General of the U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It would
be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.").
157. Facial challenges surrounding national conventions are usually time-
sensitive. See, e.g., Coal. to March, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (issuing a decision less
than two months before the 2008 RNC); see also Nanes, supra note 101, at 223
(arguing that the timing of a First Amendment challenge is vital to the outcome of
the suit).
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regulations were not narrowly tailored. 158  The regulation,
however, "need not be the least restrictive or least instructive
means" but merely not "substantially broader than necessary."'159
Some courts place the burden on the plaintiffs to establish that the
government regulation is "substantially broader than
necessary."'160  Thus, the plaintiffs have the difficult task of
demonstrating ex-ante that the government regulation will be
"substantially broader than necessary,"'161 akin to showing without
evidence that a government policy is "unreasonable."'162
C. Civil Remedies Present A Gap in Liability
Civil suits against police officers under § 1983 for violations
of First Amendment rights hinge on whether the officer acted
"reasonably."'163 For liability to attach to a municipality, however,
the actions of an officer must be causally linked to a policy,
practice, or custom of the municipality. 164 Consequently, an officer
could arbitrarily make an arrest or otherwise infringe on a
demonstrator's constitutional rights, and a municipality would not
be liable unless the municipality's actual or constructive approval
was causally linked to the officer's conduct. 165 Since a suit against
an officer, as opposed to a municipality, does not have a deterrent
effect on the municipality, the potential for creating better
158. See Bl(A)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 11-12 (citing Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1984)).
159. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, at 799-800 (1984).
160. Compare Bl(A)ck Tea Socy, 378 F.3d at 12 (rejecting a higher level of
scrutiny for prior restraints because "the City ha[d] not sought to prevent speech,
but rather, to regulate the place and manner of its expression"), with SEIU, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that when First Amendment rights are
restricted, the burden is on the defendant to show that the regulations are
narrowly tailored and that ample alternatives channels are available); see also
Nanes, supra note 101, at 217 (examing the degree of deference that courts have
given to city regulations).
161. In Stauber v. City of New York, the plaintiffs were able to use first-hand
accounts of police abuse in prior demonstrations as evidence that the New York
Police Department's policies were not narrowly tailored. Stauber v. City of New
York, 2004 WL 1593870, at *3-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004). The ability to present
testimony significantly aided the plaintiffs successful suit, a luxury that most
parties bringing facial challenges before a convention do not have. See Nanes,
supra note 101, at 202-05.
162. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 803 (holding that if the government's
means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary, its action is valid).
163. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
164. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1989).
165. See id. The municipality can also be liable for "failure to train" under
limited circumstances. Id. at 387. However, as Victory Outreach Center v. Melso,
313 F. Supp. 2d 481 (E.D. Pa. 2004) demonstrates, a minimum amount of training
will not result in liability predicated on a municipality's failure to train. Id. at 495.
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training and affirmative policies to protect First Amendment
rights through judgments, settlements, and consent decrees is
diminished. 166
Furthermore, monetary damages are an insufficient remedy
when an individual's right to dissent has been infringed at a DNC
or RNC demonstration. When a demonstrator is subject to an
arbitrary arrest, the arrested dissenter's choice of time, place, and
manner is lost. 167 Since national conventions are held once every
four years, and the particular candidate or issue may present a
one-time opportunity to protest, a dissenter's First Amendment
expression is likely lost forever. Further, most protestors will not
decide whether to engage in dissent based on the availability of
civil damages, and thus monetary remedies do not fully address
the chilling effect of abusive police practices. 168
IV. Burden-Shifting Solutions
Demonstrators who seek to challenge governmental action
emanating out of public-forum demonstrations face an uphill
battle. 169 Criminal defendants arrested in police sweeps, groups
challenging the validity of parade-route restrictions, and victims of
excessive police force seeking civil damages, are burdened with
various hurdles imposed by the current state of the law. 170 In the
criminal, constitutional, and civil damages categories, a new
burden-shifting mechanism is needed to provide increased
remedies for demonstrators whose right to dissent has been
abridged.
A. SLAPPing Frivolous Prosecutions
To reduce the problem of demonstrators having their First
Amendment rights at stake in a jury trial, the motion to dismiss
option needs to have greater force for protest defendants. 171 In the
civil context, a special motion to dismiss is available in lawsuits
aimed at chilling free speech. 172 California has such a statute,
166. See generally BOGHOSIAN, supra note 140, at 53-62 (detailing various
settlements and consent decrees reached with cities after alleged § 1983 violations
in large-scale demonstrations).
167. See Suplina, supra note 149, at 405-06.
168. See, e.g., ProtestRNC2008.org, http://protestrnc2008.org (last visited Feb.
11, 2009) (citing the war in Iraq, taxes, immigration, health care, and GLBT rights
as reasons that a coalition group was marching against the 2008 RNC).
169. See supra Part III.
170. See id.
171. See supra Part III.A.
172. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 554.01-554.05 (2000) (providing a motion to dismiss
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known as an anti-SLAPP statute (Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation). 173 California's anti-SLAPP statute reads:
A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special
motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff
has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff
will prevail on the claim. 174
If extended to a criminal context, the statute could be limited
to those who could show that their arrest stemmed from protected
First Amendment political protest. 175 The defendants would have
the initial burden of showing that they were engaged in public
forum political protest. 176 Upon satisfying that condition, the
burden would shift to the prosecution to show that the State's case
would succeed on the merits, or at least that a reasonable jury
could convict. 177 As a result, unless the prosecution makes out the
equivalent of a prima facie case, the charges against the defendant
will be dropped. 178
Providing an analogous special motion to dismiss for those
arrested while exercising their First Amendment right to dissent
would have a number of benefits. First, the risk of a defendant
being at the mercy of the jury for a charge without merit would be
reduced. As a result, the demonstrator would not feel pressured to
plea bargain and plead guilty to a reduced charge. 179
Second, the government would be aware of the extra
resources necessary to prosecute individuals charged after a mass
arrest.180 Consequently, the police would have an incentive not to
in cases involving speech aimed at procuring government action).
173. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004). Many anti-SLAPP laws
were promulgated to stop land developers from chilling public protest by filing
frivolous lawsuits to defeat public opposition. See John Barker, Common-Law and
Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPS, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 403-07
(1992-1993).
174. § 425.16(b)(1).
175. Cf. id. (indicating that the statute applies to those whose First Amendment




179. Even if an individual does not serve a prison sentence, the conviction and
charge would stay on the accused's record absent an expungement. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 609A.03 (2008) (describing the petition for criminal expungement and the
relief a petitioner can be granted).
180. See Democracy Now!, supra note 16 (noting hundreds of arrests); Police
Trampled Civil Rights During Republican National Convention, NYCLU Charges,
supra note 15 (noting the use of mesh nets to detain and arrest large numbers of
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make arbitrary arrests, or at a minimum, the prosecutors would
be encouraged to let many of those arrested go free without
charge. Third, added liberty protections would lessen the chilling
effect on public participation, since those wishing to publicly
dissent would not fear arbitrary arrest and prosecution as
strongly. 181
Additionally, a special motion to dismiss for demonstrators
would not have dramatic negative consequences. First, those that
have actually committed criminal wrongdoing would not likely
have their charges dismissed. Since the Due Process clause 8 2
requires the prosecution to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt...
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged,"''1 3  a prosecutor should not be overly taxed in
establishing the equivalent of a prima facie case at a preliminary
stage.18 4 Second, the police will not hesitate to arrest those they
believe to be committing criminal wrongdoing. Given the large
numbers of convention demonstrators who are already arrested
but not charged, the police are not likely to scale back their arrests
due to a special motion to dismiss. 8 5 Lastly, providing an easier
mechanism for charges against demonstrators to be dismissed
would not unduly expose the police or prosecutors to additional
civil liability. ' 8 6  Qualified immunity would still protect
prosecutors and police performing discretionary functions from
liability. 187
Shifting the burden through the use of a special motion to
dismiss would also fit within the spirit of established Supreme
Court precedent. A "clear and convincing" standard of proof is
required when the individual interests at stake are both
"particularly important" and "more substantial than a mere loss of
money" in any state proceeding that threatens an individual with
"a significant deprivation of liberty." 88  The curtailment of
demonstrators).
181. See Coleman, supra note 2 (noting the chilling effect on the public of the
arrests of demonstrators).
182. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
183. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
184. Granted, the government would have the time and expense of defending the
special motion to dismiss for those with meritorious charges against them.
However, the special motion to dismiss would likely not be in addition to a regular
dismissal motion, and thus some of the expense would be mitigated.
185. See Pheifer, supra note 46.
186. See Kjellsen v. Mills, 517 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Harlow v. Butterfield, 457 U.S. 800 (1981)).
187. Id.
188. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
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expression through mass arrest and the subsequent chilling of
First Amendment rights experienced by the criminal defendant is
a deprivation of liberty.18 9 Thus, a special motion to dismiss would
properly extend Supreme Court protections against the
deprivation of liberty caused by the chilling of free speech. 190
B. Burden Shifting of the "Narrowly Tailored"
Determination for Facial Sufficiency
The burden of proof should not only be shifted to the
government in criminal cases, but also in TRO determinations
regarding the facial constitutionality of government regulations
and policies. Commentators have criticized the Rock Against
Racism test of content-neutrality, narrow tailoring, and providing
ample alternative channels for communication, on many levels.
Some scholars have attacked the content-neutrality prong as
unduly limiting the time, place, and manner of public protest.' 91
Others have criticized the Court for being overly deferential to the
government-claimed security interest when determining if the
regulation is narrowly tailored. 9 2  While these thoughtful
criticisms are valid, no signs point to the Rock Against Racism test
becoming undone, or lower courts suddenly not being at least
somewhat deferential to purported "security" interests. 193
All courts recognize that speech in public forums is
presumptively protected under the First Amendment. 94
Therefore, courts should treat the Rock Against Racism test for
189. See Suplina, supra note 149, at 408-09 (citing C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned
Unreasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place and Manner
Regulations, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 945-48 (1983)).
190. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756.
191. See Crocker, supra note 12, at 2601-02 (characterizing the right to
publically dissent as an autonomy and liberty issue).
192. See Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 102, at 1240 (questioning
whether security concerns actually motivate the censoring of political protest);
Suplina, supra note 149, at 409-12 (analyzing free speech restrictions justified by
the war on terror).
193. Rock Against Racism has been positively examined or discussed in over 500
cases since its adjudication. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 711 (2000)
(holding that a criminal statute that prohibited any person from knowingly coming
within eight feet of another individual near a health care facility was a narrowly
tailored, content neutral, time, place, and manner regulation); Vincent v.
Bloomberg, 476 F.3d 74, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying the narrowly tailored, content
neutral, time, place, and manner test to a New York City ordinance that prohibited
the sale of aerosol spray paint containers and broad tipped indelible markers to
individuals under the age of twenty-one).
194. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
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what it is: an exception to the rule. 195 In the context of a TRO,
the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits. 196 The plaintiff, however, should only have to show that
he seeks to engage in public political protest. Any time, place, and
manner restrictions on such speech should not be presumptively
valid. Instead, the burden should shift to the government to show
that the regulations are content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and
leave ample alternative channels available.
The Service Employee International Union court and Stauber
court followed this approach and shifted the burden to the
government. 197 The Bl(A)ck Tea Society court merely noted that
"intermediate scrutiny" was appropriate and did not explicitly
indicate who had the burden of proof.198 The Coalition to March
on the RNC court also did not address the issue. 199
Had the Bl(A)ck Tea Society court shifted the burden to the
government in order to show that its plan was narrowly tailored,
the outcome may have been different. 200 Although the court noted
that "the challenged regulation imposed a substantial burden on
free expression," 20 1 and the district court characterized the
designated demonstration zone as an "internment camp," 20 2 the
court was unwilling to overturn the government regulation. 20 3
Had the court started with a presumption that the government
restrictions on free speech were invalid, the court may have been
more comfortable granting the TRO.204
A burden-shifting rule may not have changed the outcome in
Coalition to March on the RNC. Judge Ericksen held that the
demonstrators were afforded "unprecedented access to the
195. Suplina, supra note 149, at 397 (describing "time, place, and manner"
restrictions as an exception).
196. See, e.g., Bl(A)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004)
(stating that the likelihood of success on the merits is one of four factors that courts
must weigh in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction).
197. SEIU, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see Kastner v. Cinnamon,
No. 04L-005081, 2007 WL 1593870, at *26 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2007); Nanes, supra note
101, at 217.
198. 378 F.3d at 12; cf. SEIU, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 970 ("The government bears
the burden of proving that a prior restraint on speech is constitutional.").
199. Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F.
Supp. 1014 (D. Minn. 2008).
200. See Bl(A)ck Tea Socy, 378 F.3d 8.
201. Id. at 13.
202. Coal. to Protest the DNC v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74 (D. Mass.
2004).
203. Bl(A)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 13.
204. See id. at 8.
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convention site,"20 5 and were allowed to come "within sight and
sound of the delegates," an accommodation not afforded to the
2004 DNC demonstrators. 20 6  Although the access to the
demonstrators may have objectively been "narrowly tailored," the
court used the Bl(A)ck Tea Society opinion as a constitutional floor,
which the 2008 St. Paul RNC regulations easily cleared. 207 Thus,
had the Bl(A)ck Tea Society court shifted the burden to the
government and ruled for the demonstrators, the floor could have
been set much higher at either the "sight and sound" of the
delegates or some other less restrictive time, place, and manner
constraint.
Additionally, placing the burden on the government to show
that its regulations are narrowly tailored would have other
positive effects. As the policy-change settlements indicate, the
government, when pressured, can craft policies that are not as
unduly restrictive of the right to publically dissent.208  Policy
changes, such as forbidding arrests without evidence that a crime
was committed or forbidding the use of less-lethal munitions on
non-violent demonstrators, exemplify the narrow tailoring of
government policies. 209 If the government is aware that it bears
the burden in any subsequent TRO determinations, officials may
have incentives to craft policies that can be defended in court.
Further, by starting with more narrowly tailored policies in the
first place, demonstrators' right to dissent may be curtailed less.
As government policies become more narrowly tailored and
restrictions are lifted, the individuals could feel less chilled from
publicly exercising their First Amendment rights. 210
C. Shifting the Burden to the Municipality in Civil
Damages Cases
In addition to criminal cases and constitutional challenges, in
order to address the potential gap in liability posed by the "policy,
205. Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F.
Supp. 2d 1014, 1021 (D. Minn. 2008). In fact, the St. Paul Police intentionally
created a "free speech zone," which was distinct from that used in Boston, in that it
was much closer to the convention venue, was not heavily guarded, had no
covering, and used fencing which allowed speakers to be seen as well as heard.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 37-38.
206. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 37-38; see 378 F.3d at 11.
207. See Coal. to March on the RNC, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
208. See supra Part II.D.
209. See BOGHOSIAN, supra note 140, at 53-62.
210. See Coleman, supra note 2; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at
15 (noting numerous community members' feeling that "St. Paul took on the
appearance of a Police State").
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custom, or practice of the municipality" and "reasonableness" of
the officer's actions, courts should once again engage in a different
type of burden shifting. 211 A police officer standing in a line with
other officers in full riot gear is acting pursuant to an order.
Should an individual officer then make an arbitrary arrest or
otherwise unduly harm a demonstrator, the municipality should
not escape liability. Simply because the individual officer was
neither ordered to perform the unlawful act nor had received prior
adequate training does not mitigate the harm suffered by the
public from the officer's actions. 212 Those whose free speech is
chilled when shot with rubber bullets do not see an individual
officer harming them, but see a collective action of an aggressive
police force. 213 Therefore, municipalities should be presumptively
liable for police officers who act unreasonably toward lawful
demonstrators in large-scale political demonstrations. As a
defense, the municipality could show that the officer disobeyed a
direct order or otherwise violated police department policy.
Shifting the burden to the municipality to demonstrate that
an officer acted against orders, policies, or training would
incentivize police departments to give enhanced training for large-
scale demonstrations. Police departments would also be
encouraged to craft policies regarding the handling of large crowds
that are less violent and confrontational. 214 Shifting the burden to
the municipality would not cause frivolous litigation, as a showing
that the officer unreasonably violated a plaintiffs clearly
established constitutional rights would still have to be
established. 21 5
Conclusion
The 2008 RNC in St. Paul represented a continuation of free
speech chilling tactics against demonstrators. Mass arrests,
preemptive raids, and violent dispersals of otherwise peaceful
crowds will continue to be seen at national conventions and other
large protests. In a post-September 11 world, security threats,
211. See supra discussion Part II.C.
212. See BOGHOSIAN, supra note 140, at 43 ("Would-be protesters or entire
communities frequently targeted by the police may decide it is not worth the risk of
encountering police violence and possible arrest.").
213. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 36-37, 64 (noting the use of less-
lethal munitions to disperse crowds).
214. Cf. Final Day, supra note 38 (noting the use of tear gas, pepper spray, and
concussion grenades to disperse crowds).
215. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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both real and imagined, will trump the right to dissent.216
Consequently, police tactics that are "an insult to the First
Amendment" 217 will continue to be administered.
The courts, however, have yet to fully address the necessity of
changing the legal framework in the context of large-scale political
protests. The criminal defendant arbitrarily arrested and charged
needs a quicker way to have the merits of his case heard. The
demonstration group seeking a TRO against an unduly restrictive
government regulation should face a lower evidentiary hurdle.
The demonstrator whose constitutional rights were violated must
be allowed to hold not only the individual tortfeasor, but also the
municipality liable for the irreparable harm suffered. Shifting
legal burdens to the government to show that its actions are
legitimate would increase protections for those who choose to
dissent and curtail the chilling effect of government restriction on
free expression.
On September 4, 2008, the RNC in the Twin Cities came to
an end. Republican Presidential candidate John McCain and the
Republicans used the Twin Cities as a forum to express their ideas
to the nation. Many seeking to simultaneously convey opposing
views to the nation, however, were chilled by government
action.218 Once the RNC was over, and the delegates and major
media presence left the Twin Cities, the opportunity to express
one's views on a national stage was over. The marketplace of
ideas, while still technically open in the Twin Cities, no longer had
any buyers. If the First Amendment is truly valued, those
choosing to dissent must be given adequate access to the national
forum created by national conventions without significant
government interference.
216. See Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 102, at 1257-59; Suplina, supra
note 149, at 409-12.
217. Coal. to Protest the DNC v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 76 (D. Mass.
2004).
218. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5.
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